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Social Security and Labor Supply Incentives
ABSTRACT
Manyprovisions of the Social Security Program distort an individual's
labor supply incentives. In particular, the payroll tax, the earnings test,
the offsetting actuarial adjustment, and the dependence of the size of
future benefits on the level of current earnings all affect the net return
to extra work. The purpose of this paper is to estiinate the size of the
net tax rate on labor income in a variety of circumstances, taking into
account all these provisions, as well as the personal income tax. We find
thatthe Social Security Program on net in the past has provided a large
subsidy tolabor supply, which for many people effectively offset the per-
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Many provisions of the Social Security Program distort an individual's labor supply
incentives. In addition to the payroll tax, whose current rate is 13.4% (combined employee and
employer rates), those qualified to receive Social Security benefits face the earnings test, which
imposes a tax rate of 50% on earnings. To the extent that benefits are withheld, however,
future benefits are increased through an actuarial adjustment (or, after age 65, a delayed
retirement credit). Also, since the formula used in computing benefits depends on past
earnings, the return to work increases whenever extra work leads to extra future benefits.
Not only are these explicit or implicit tax rates large, but they have been changing
substantially across time. The 1977 Social Security amendments, in particular, had a large
effect on these tax rates for most people. In addition, younger cohorts face very different
effective tax rates than older cohorts, even at the same date.
Individuals, when deciding when and how much to work, must take each of these tax effects
into account. Rather than basing their labor supply decisions solely on the market value of the
output they produce, as economic theory argues would lead to efficient decisions, individuals
must worry as well about how their taxes and Social Security benefits change when they work
more. To the extent that they revise their labor supply decisions in response to these various
taxes and subsidies, efficiency costs arise. Given the large size of many of these distortions, the
resulting efficiency costs could be quite severe.
It is too easy, however, to focus on any one of these distortions in isolation, and argue that
cutting the size of that distortion would lead to important efficiency gains.' The size of the
efficiency cost depends on the net distortion left when all the various effects of Social Security
*BellLaboratories, Murray Hill, New Jersey. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author, and do not
necessarily represent those of Bell Laboratories or the Bell System.-2-
are combined together with the personal income tax and any other labor supply distortions,
such as may arise from private or state and local government pension plans.2 Calculating the
size of this net distortion is quite complicated, but is necessary in order to judge the efficiency
effect of any one particular distortion.
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the size of this net tax rate on labor income for
various cohorts at various stages in their lives.3 Since many effects must be taken into account,
each of which can vary greatly in size for different individuals, the reported numbers are
intended to be merely illustrative rather than in any way definitive.
I. Derivation of Net Tax Rate
When an individual considers whether to work more and earn an extra dollar, to what
degree do the taxes he pays, or the transfers he receives change as a result? The net change in
the sum of these various taxes and transfers is the net tax rate on labor supply that he faces. In
this section, we will describe what information we need to measure this net tax rate.
The largest extra tax an individual normally pays when he works more is the personal
income tax. Denote his marginal tax bracket by m.
In addition, he must pay extra payroll taxes, as long as he is covered by Social Security, as
we assume, and has not already in that year earned more than the maximum taxable earnings
under Social Security ($29,700 in 1981). Let the statutory total payroll tax rate for all the
combined Social Security programs be denoted by p (6.65% in 1981). Both the employee and
the employer must pay this tax. Since the employer's contribution is implicitly deductible from
taxable income under the personal income tax, the net payroll tax rate is p (2—rn).
The individual's extra dollar in earnings may also raise his future Social Security benefits.
Any resulting increase in the present value of future benefits provides a subsidy to current
labor supply. The calculation of the size of this subsidy is quite complicated, however. A
description of the procedure prior to 1977 is found in Blinder, Gordon, and Wise (1980), while-3-
a description for the current law is found in the appendix. Let us denote the resulting increase
in the present value of future benefits, if any, resulting from an extra dollar of earnings by b.
These three effects would normally occur for individuals of any age. For those who are
already qualified to receive benefits, however, an additional tax may arise as a result of the
earnings test. According to the current law, any individual between ages 65 and 69, and any
individual between 62 and 64 who has already registered for Social Security benefits, can have
some or all of his Social Security benefits withheld to the degree that he earns more than an
exempt amount. In particular, in 1981, if an individual has already earned at least $5,500in
that year, and then earns an extra dollar, his Social Security benefits in that year will be reduced
by 50 cents (assuming he is still receiving any). Denote this tax rate, which is either .5 or .0,
by e.
Tothe degree that he does lose current benefits, however, his future benefits will be
increased. For individuals aged 62 to 64, the intent of the law is to provide an actuarially fair
increase in future benefits for those who forego current benefits. For those 65 to 69 prior to
1977 the increase in future benefits was very small, but the 1977 amendments tripled the size
of this delayed retirement credit to the point where it is now almost half the size of the
adjustment for those aged 62 to 64. Let us denote the average size of the present value of this
compensating increase in future benefits by a.
Given the distortions described above, the net tax tpaidon an extra dollar of earnings
equals
t=m+p(2—m)+e—b—a (1)
In principle, we could add yet further distortions. State income taxes are omitted, as are
distortions created by private pension plans. In addition, the individual may face sales taxes
when he tries to spend his earnings. For simplicity, we ignore these further complications.-4-
II. Measurement of the Net Tax Rate
The main purpose of this paper is to calculate the size of this net tax rate tforindividuals in
various cohorts at various stages in their lives. In particular, we calculate the net tax rate at
four ages, 45, 55, 62, and 65, for individuals in each of three cohorts, those born in 1910,
1920, and 1940. The calculations reflect the experiences of an average male worker with or
without a wife receiving spouse's benefits under Social Security, and an average female
receiving either worker's benefits or spouse's benefits.
The resulting numbers appear in Table 1. Details concerning the calculations of these
numbers can be found in the appendix. A number of assumptions are made in calculating
these numbers. For example, it is assumed that:
1)Individuals had perfect foresight concerning what benefit formula they would face at
retirement. As a result, these numbers reflect the net tax rate cx post, and not
necessarily that which individuals thought they faced at the time.
2)By 2005, individuals are assumed to qualify for full Social Security benefits at age 68
rather than at age 65, and for reduced benefits at age 65 rather than at age 62. As a
result, it is assumed that 38 years of earnings rather than 35 will be used in computing
the size of Social Security benefits. In all other respects, the benefit formula is assumed
to remain unchanged.
In addition, we have assumed that extra earnings at each of these ages will result in extra
future Social Security benefits, and that after age 62, the individual will have extra Social
Security benefits withheld when he works more. In any given situation, though, either or both
of these effects could equal zero, implying dramatic changes in the net tax rate t.Inparticular,
as a result of the 1977 amendments which blow up earnings at earlier ages by an indexing
factor, it is less likely that earnings at age 65 will be high enough to be included in the benefit
computation. If not, b equals zero, and tincreasesby the value of b reported in the table.5-5-
Thefigures also represent average values for mandb.Bothof these figures can vary
greatly across individuals. Given the progressive nature of both the personal income tax
schedule and the Social Security benefit formula, individuals with high personal tax rates inwill
also tend to have low values for b, accentuating the variation in t acrossindividuals.
Ill. Implications of the Resulting Tax Rates
What do the average figures tell us about labor supply incentives? While the numbers
basically speak for themselves, several implications ought to be noted explicitly:
1)The Social Security Program, in most cases, provides a net subsidy to labor supply
throughout the bulk of a person's working life. That is, until age 65 most workers face
a net tax rate twhichis smaller than their personal tax rate in.Infact, for the cohort
aged 65 in 1975, labor supply of men with wives receiving spouse's benefits was
subsidized on net, in spite of the personal income tax. Even among the cohort aged 65
in 1985, such couples would face basically no net tax at all throughout the bulk of their
lives —thepersonal income tax is just offset by the Social Security subsidy.
2)The subsidy rate from Social Security drops dramatically between 1975and1985,
mainlyas a result of the 1977 amendments to the Social Security act. These
amendments changed the benefit formula, causing b to fall. While the amendments
also increased the size of a, this change proved to be less important.
3)For the cohort turning 65 in 2005, the subsidy from Social Security will effectively have
disappeared for those receiving both worker's and spouse's benefits, and turned into a
net tax for those receiving just worker's benefits. They pay this net tax rate from Social
Security throughout the bulk of their working lives, even while their older
contemporaries at any date are likely to face a net subsidy.
4)In all cases, those receiving just worker's benefits fare much worse than those receiving
both worker's and spouse's benefits. Female workers fare slightly better than male-6-
workers. Female spouses, however, normally face very high net tax rates.
5)In all cases, workers face a net tax at age 65 (when b and e are both nonzero). For
married men, this tax rate was quite small prior to 1977, but has risen substantially
since then. For single workers, the tax rate was and continues to be extremely high.
6)The individual's net tax rate varies dramatically between years in which earnings do and
do not enter the Social Security benefit formula. When a year's earnings do not enter
the benefit formula, b would equal zero, and t would increase by the value of b shown
in the Table. For example, the net tax rate of a 65 year old in 1975 would be .010 on
average if his earnings are high enough to enter the benefit formula, but would increase
to .010 + .588 =.598otherwise. This sharp variation encourages people to concentrate
their work effort into those years whidh do not enter the benefit formula.
7)Since the 1977 amendments, the law has provided an incentive to postpone registration
for Social Security benefits until age 65. That is, for the later two cohorts, the gain
from increased future benefits (a) outweighs the loss in current benefits (e). Prior to
the amendments, there was very little effect from postponed registration.6
8)The earnings test, even with the actuarial adjustment, results in both large and variable
net tax rates among individuals already qualified to receive benefits. The resulting net
tax rates strongly encourage working hard between ages 62 and 64 rather than working
after 65. Were both the earnings test and the actuarial adjustment eliminated, the net
tax rates would change as shown in Table 2. Such a statutory change leads to both
lower tax rates and smoother patterns of tax rates across different ages.Age mpe
65 .135 .059 .5
62 .163 .052 .5
55 .188 .037 .0
45 .213 .02.0
65 .117 .071 .5
62 .139 .067 .5
55 .195 .059 .0
45 .188 .036 .0
68 .117 .G77 .5
65 .139 .077 .5
55 .169 .077 .0
45 .169 .071 .0
Note: For a description of the derivation of these numbers, see the appendix.
TABLE I
Calculation of Net Marginal Tax Rates
Male Worker Female
with Spouse MaleWorker FemaleWorker Spouse
a bI a bI a b I at
Cohort Aged 65 in 1975
.146 .588.010.044 .303 .397 .054 .388.302
.496 .535 -.272.398 .290 .071.484 .357 -.082
.0.418 -.164 .0.215 .039 .0.275 -.021
.0.379 -.130 .0.195 .054 .0.249.000
Cohort Aged 65 in 1985
.366 .294.090.182 .153 .415 .237 .196.317
.768 .262 -.266.569 .137 .058 .736 .163 -.135
.0.294.007 .0.153 .148 .0.196.105
.0.294 -.040 .0.153 .101 .0.196.058
Cohort Aged 65 in 2005
.324 .178.259.159 .093 .509 .209 .119.433
.691 .158 -.068.504 .084 .193.659 .101.021
.0 .178.131 .0.093 .216 .0 .119.190













Effect on the Net Tax Rate of Eliminating the Earnings Test
and the Actuarial Adjustment
Net Tax Rate
Male Worker
with Spouse Male Worker Female Worker Female Spouse
CurrentAfterCurrentAfterCurrentAfterCurrentAfter
Age LawChange LawChange LawChangeLaw Change
Cohort Aged 65in1985
65 .123 -.011 .450 .132 .362 .099 .750 .25
62 -.236 .032 .089 .158 -.098 .138 -.217 .264
Cohort Aged 65in2005
65 .279 .103 .530 .189 .460 .169 .761 .261
62 -.050 .141 .212 .216 .044 .203 -.097 .281FOOTNOTES
*BellLaboratories, Murray Hill, New Jersey. The views expressed in this paper are those of
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1.It is also too easy to attempt to estimate to what degree individuals change their labor
supply in response to any one of these distortions, ignoring the presence of the other
distortions.
2. The size of efficiency costs would depend as well on the nature of other distortions, for
second best reasons.
3.For earlier attempts, see Burkhauser and Turner (1978, 1981).
4. See Blinder, Gordon, and Wise (1980) for further discussion.
5. For the cohort aged 65 in 1975, 19 out of the 25 years of earnings between 1951 and 1975
will enter the benefit calculation, in which case b would correspond to the numbers
reported in Table I. During the other six years, b would equal zero. For the cohort aged
65 in 1985, 26 out of 35 years of earnings between 1951 and 1985 will enter the benefit
calculation, while for the youngest cohort, 38 out of the 44 years of earnings between 1962
and 2005 will enter.
6. While there is a net loss from delaying registration until 63, there is a slightly larger net
gain for postponing registration from 63 to 65.
7. By law, I, equals 1.0 for ages tover60.
8. The intention here is to measure the average b for those whose earnings that year are
included in the benefit formula. A slightly larger percent would have had that year's
earnings included in the benefit formula, however, than would have had a positive value of
b since b would equal zero in addition for those receiving benefits based on the minimum
PIA or the special minimum PIA. The reported average value of b, as a result, is slightlyF-2
overestimated.
9. For the cohort reaching 65 in 1975, T equaled the year they turned 65 (1975) minus 1956.
The shift to using age 62 rather than age 65 when computing T was phased in starting the
next year.
10. We calculated that for a representative man, B drops by 9.8% for a worker and spouse, and
11.3% for a worker only.
11. During the 1952-1980 period, the ratio was approximately equal to (l.005)6t, assuming a
14% personal tax rate. Given the decline in productivity growth in recent years, we
lowered the ratio slightly, though data for 1981-2 would argue for a much larger drop.
12. These figures for b would be too large cx ante, since b is large due in part to inflation
unexpected ten or twenty years earlier.APPENDIX
Derivation of Tax Rates
The tax rates reported in Table 1 were calculated using the following procedures:
eand p:These figures reflect the statutory rates prevailing, or specified in the law to prevail, at
each date.
m: These figures for the average marginal personal tax rate are rather crude. The basic source
of data was a random sample of tax returns from 1972, compiled by the Treasury (the "Tax
Sim" file), on which the age of the filer was reported. Daniel Feenberg kindly calculated the
average marginal tax rate by age group in this sample.
In order to estimate the average marginal tax rate at each age in years other than 1972, we
assumed that the average marginal tax rate at each age was proportional to the overall average
tax rate. This average tax rate (tax revenues/taxable income) is reported yearly in the Statistics
of Income. We assumed in addition that the latest reported average tax rate would remain
unchanged through 2005.
a: The figures for 1975 for the size of the actuarial adjustment for men (or the delayed
retirement credit) were taken from Blinder, Gordon, and Wise (1981). The figures for 1985
for men come from Blinder, Gordon, and Wise (1980). The figures for 2005 for men were
calculated by the same procedure used for the 1985 figures, but incorporate the assumed
postponement in the full and reduced benefit eligibility ages by three years. The figures for
women, in all cases were calculated by the same procedures but incorporate female life
expectancies, and statutory differences with regard to spouse benefits.
b: The basic source for the various values of b are the calculations reported in Blinder, Gordon
and Wise (1980). Their figures are the average of the values of b at age 65 within a large
random sample of men reaching age 65 in 1975, calculated under the 1975 law and as theyA-2
would have been after the 1977 amendments.
In describing how the reported figures were derived from these figures, it is worth describing
in some detail how b would be calculated after the 1977 amendments. In calculating the size of
benefits, first the average indexed monthly earnings (AIME) must be calculated. The AIME
equals the average of the T years of highest indexed yearly earnings between 1951 and the
current year, where T equals the year in which the individual turns 62 minus 1956 (with a
maximum value of 35). Indexed earnings at age Iequalactual earnings (which are subject to
the payroll tax) in year ttimesthe ratio of national average earnings in the year the individual
is aged 60 divided by national average earnings in the year the individual is age:. Denote this
ratio by 4.7 Then when the individual earns an extra dollar at age t,hisAIME increases by
12T(The 12 converts yearly earnings to monthly earnings.)
The next step in computing benefits is to compute the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA),
ÔPIA given the value of the AIME. For most individuals under the current law, the slope ÔAIME
equals .32. The increase in monthly benefits, assuming registration at age 65, then equals
It PIA
AIME ,wheredepends on family composition, and equals 1.0 for a retired worker
and 1.5 for a worker whose wife receives spouse's benefits. Let B equal the actuarial present
value at age 65 of this increase in benefits. (In calculating B, we used a 1% discount rate.) The
value of this increase as of age tisthen B




Note that this procedure omits any effect of current earnings on possible future disability
benefits, capturing only the increase in retirement benefits. The resulting estimates of b, as
reported in Table 1, are slightly too small as a result, particularly at younger ages.
Blinder, Gordon, and Wise (1980) calculated the value of b resulting from earnings of 65
year old men in 1975. Within a random sample of white men, they found an average value forA-3
b of .543 for married men, whose wives were assumed to receive spouse's benefits, and .256
forthe single men. In calculating these figures, however, individuals were included for whom
b equaled zero. Among those for whom b was positive, b averaged .588 for married men and
.303 for single men.8
Had the 1977 amendments applied in 1975, Blinder, Gordon, and Wise (1980) calculated
that for 65 year olds the average value of b, among those for whom b was positive, would have
been .422 for married men and .210 for single men. The reported figures for 65 year old men
in 1985 differ because in 1985 T equals 26 rather than 19. The figures for 65 year olds in 2005
differ first in that T now equals 38 (rather than 35 due to the assumed postponement in the
retirement age by three years). In addition, B would be lower as a result of the postponement
of the start of benefits until age 68.10
We had available no equivalent data on the value of b for 65 year old women, so assumed
in each case that, except for differences in life expectancy, the value for women would equal
that for men. While women would normally have lower earnings, so a higher b due to the
progressive PIA formula, those women with a PIA sufficiently high to receive worker's benefits
rather than spouse's benefits may not differ that dramatically from men in their value of b (life
expectancy aside).
In calculating the values for b at ages 55 and 45, we assumed that the individual expected to
start receiving benefits at age 65. Then for the cohort aged 65 in 1985 or in 2005, when the
1977 amendments apply, the value of b at age t equals the value of b at age 65 times
It
65—:Weset this ratio equal to 1.0 in the calculations.1' For the cohort aged 65 in 1975,
(1+r)
prior to the 1977 amendments, the value of b at age t equals the value of b at age 65
discounted at a nominal after tax interest rate. In particular, we used the ten or twenty year
government bond rate and the average value of m prevailing in that year.'2
In calculating b for age 62, we assumed that the individual started receiving benefits at age
62 rather than age 65. This, in practice, reduces slightly the present value of benefits, and theA-4
value of b.Wecalculated the degree of reduction for a representative individual (one with a
three year younger spouse, if any, and no other dependents).REFERENCES
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